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Using interview data on preferences for changes in own and spouse’s labor supply, I find that 
men put a higher value on women’s non-market time than vice versa. This is the opposite of 
what the unitary model of the household predicts when both spouses participate in labor 
market work. 
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1. Introduction 
A major problem for understanding decision making in households is that we usually only 
observe the outcome of the household decision process. It is seldom possible to observe the 
decision process itself and the preferences of the individual household members. Therefore it 
is not surprising that the empirical literature testing household models is rather small. Various 
approaches have been used to look inside the black box of household decision making. This 
paper adds to the empirical literature by using a new type of data, data on stated preferences 
for own and for the spouse’s labor supply, to test predictions of household models.  
 
Most of the economic models of the household belong to one of the three groups of unitary 
models (Becker, 1991), bargaining models (e.g. McElroy and Horney, 1981, and Lundberg 
and Pollak, 1993) and collective models (e.g. Chiappori, 1992). To be extremely brief, the 
unitary model assumes that the individuals in a household maximize a common utility 
function; the bargaining models assume that household decisions are a result of a non-
cooperative game; and the collective model assumes that the household decisions are the 
outcome of a Pareto efficient cooperative game. In this paper I focus on the empirical 
implications and empirical tests of the models, but see Bergstrom (1997) for an overview of 
the theoretical literature. 
 
The models have conflicting positive and normative implications. In the unitary model it does 
not matter for consumption choices who earns the income in a household as long as the total 
income is the same, i.e. incomes are pooled. In the bargaining and collective models the 
income share earned by each person typically affects the distribution of consumption within 
the household. Outside options, such as the state of the marriage market, can affect the 
distribution of consumption within the household in favor of the member with best outside 
options in bargaining and collective models, but not in the unitary model. There are also 
important differences between bargaining and collective models. In the collective models 
outcomes are always Pareto efficient. This is not necessarily the case in bargaining models.  
 
The most tested assumption of any household model is the income pooling assumption of the 
unitary model. This is also an assumption of great normative importance. For example, using 
Brazilian data, Thomas (1990) shows there is a relationship between the share of household 
income earned by women and spending on goods that benefit children. This has been   2
interpreted as evidence against income pooling. However, Thomas (1990) tests whether there 
is a correlation between the distribution of income within the household and the consumption 
pattern, and it is doubtful whether such a correlation constitutes a causal relationship from 
income distribution to consumption distribution. There may very well be preferences driving 
both the share of earnings and the distribution of income within a family.  
 
Collective models and household bargaining models are sometimes tested by regressing the 
share of single males versus single females for different age cohorts and regions on the 
distribution of consumption within the household, see e.g. Chiappori et al 2002. Again, 
causality is a crucial issue and it could be argued that the results are driven by the preferences. 
In older cohorts, men tend to be scarcer, but there may be other differences between age 
cohorts that can explain differences in the outcome variable. Regional differences in the share 
of single men and women are likely to driven by differences between local regional market 
conditions, which may have a direct impact on the outcome variables. The possible 
misspecification bias may go in both directions. For example, when they use instrumental 
variables to take account of endogeneity, Attanasio and Lechene (2002) find greater 
deviations from the predictions of the unitary model, than in their OLS estimation. 
 
Three methods have been used to avoid misspecification problems when testing household 
models. The first and most obvious one is to find ‘natural experiment’ data with exogenous 
variation in right-hand side variables. Such data are not common, but exogenous changes in 
income shares of men and women have been used by Lundberg et al (1997), Ward-Batts 
(2007), and Attanasio and Lechene (2002). These studies found that an increase of the 
women’s share of income changes the composition of household consumption in favor of 
goods typically consumed by women.
1 This goes against income pooling. Apart from income 
pooling none of the hypotheses generated by household models have been tested with data 
from natural experiments. 
 
The relative lack of data suitable for testing household models has led some researchers to 
look beyond data on actual labor supply and actual consumption choices. Iversen et al (2006) 
perform experimental tests and find that household members cooperate to a large extent, but 
                                                 
1 However, see Hotchkiss (2005) for criticism of Lundberg et al (1997), and Ward-Batts (2007) footnote 2 for a 
discussion of Hotchkiss’ critique.   3
not to the extent that total income maximization is a reasonable approximation of observed 
behavior. They also observe substantial differences between the two villages they have 
studied in the degree of total income maximization. Their results thus suggest that different 
household models, or at least different parameterization of household models, are appropriate 
in different cases. Experimental tests seem to be a promising avenue for future research on 
household models. They have one drawback, however. It is always possible for the spouses to 
redistribute the monetary gains from an economic experiment after the experiment. Therefore 
it is not possible to observe the final distribution of consumption, when the income shares for 
men and women are changed in an experiment.  
 
The third approach to avoid the difficulties commonly present when testing household models 
is to analyze interview data to obtain information on the decision making process. Attanasio 
and Lechene (2002) investigate the Mexican Progresa reform, which targets substantial 
economic support to women. They use interview data on the bargaining power of men and 
women in the decision process in the family.
2 They find that women’s bargaining power 
increases when their income share increases.  
 
In this paper, I use interview data on preferences for own and partner’s labor supply. Thereby 
I can observe preferences directly. To my knowledge this is the first time data on stated 
preferences for partners labor supply is used to test household models. However, the idea is 
not new. Kooreman and Kapetyn (1990) and Kapetyn and Kooreman (1992) suggest that data 
on preferences for partners as well as own labor supply would be useful for identifying 
bargaining models in empirical studies of household models. Using stated preferences is 
uncommon since economists, for good reasons, prefer to study revealed preferences instead. 
One reason for deviating from this practice when studying household decision making, is that 
we only observe actual choices at the household level, and thus cannot observe the revealed 
preferences of the individual members of the household.
3 If we for example observe that the 
husband does less housework than the wife, we cannot determine whether this is a result of 
                                                 
2 They also analyze consumption data and find that increasing the income share of women affects consumption 
patterns, which is in line with their finding of increased bargaining power of women.  
3 If we know the household decision making process, we may be able to recover individual preferences. For 
example Blundell et al (2007) assume that the collective model of household labor supply is the correct one, and 
can, given that assumption, estimate individual utility functions. In this paper I test household models, which, of 
course, is a different exercise.   4
the preferences or of the bargaining positions of the household members. To preview the 
results I find that men put a higher value on women’s non-market time
4 than vice versa. This 
is in contrast to the unitary model, since the marginal utilities of non-market time should 
equal the wage rate, which is usually higher for men. 
 
2 Empirical analysis 
The data in this study was originally used by the Swedish Metro newspaper for an article on 
work and leisure. The data were thus not tailor-made to test household models. Still it 
contains information that is useful for testing such models. 
 
2.1 Data  
The data is obtained from a telephone survey conducted by the market intelligence company 
TNS Gallup. It is a random sample of individuals in the three biggest cities in Sweden, 
Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö.  The survey contains questions on the respondent’s 
background characteristics and a number of questions related to labor supply.  
 
Two questions explicitly ask the respondent whether he/she would be willing to reduce his/her 
working time by 2 days a month with a pay reduction of SEK 1000 and whether he/she would 
be willing to work ten more hours a month for SEK 1000. The respondents were also asked to 
answer the same questions but as if the offers were given to their partner instead.  
 
The responses to the question on lowering income by SEK 1000 (approximately USD 150) to 
get two days off from work are shown in Table 1. This is a generous offer since forgone 
income is well below two days’ pay for almost all workers. Out of 271 workers, 146 would 
accept the offer, and 179 would like their partner to accept the offer. There is a positive 
correlation of 0.57 between preferences for own and partner labor supply.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The answers to question 2, whether the respondent would be willing to work ten more hours 
per month for SEK 1000 (approximately USD 150) are shown in Table 2. In general the 
respondents were less interested in this offer, and most respondents declined it. The 
                                                 
4 It is also common to use the term leisure for non-market time.   5
correlation between preferences for own and partner’s labor supply is somewhat lower for 
question 2 than for question 1, 0.47. 
 




In the unitary model labor could be supplied either by one or both spouses. The casewhere 
one spouse does all the labor market work, while the other spouse is a full-time home-maker 
is very uncommon in Sweden. Less than two percent of the women and less than half a 
percent of the men aged between 16 and 64 were full-time home-makers in 2003. We 
therefore only consider the case where both spouses supply labor. The prediction of the 
unitary model is then that marginal income should equal the marginal value of non-market 
time, and thus that the marginal value of non-market time is lowest for the spouse with the 
lowest wage, see Becker, 1991. In this case, the spouse with a higher income would be less 
willing to accept an increase in working hours on behalf of himself or herself than on behalf 
of the spouse. Unfortunately, we only have data on the total income of the household. 
However, we can use the fact that the husband usually earns more than the wife and split the 
sample into men and women. This is done in Table 3 and 4.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In the ‘total’ columns of Table 3, men are actually more willing than women to increase their 
working hours, for the given wage of SEK 1000 for ten hours of work. This is at odds with the 
prediction of the unitary model. The pattern in Table 4 is more in line with the unitary model; 
women are less willing than men to reduce working time, for a given wage decrease. A 
possible explanation for this finding is that men are less loss averse than women (see e.g. 
Brooks and Zank, 2005). Loss aversion causes individuals to avoid negative changes from a 
reference value, for example current income and current leisure. If men are less loss averse 
than women, they will therefore be more willing to accept changes in general. This may 
explain why men are more willing than women to accept both increases and decreases in 
working time. Only looking at the total columns of Table 3 and 4 does not offer any   6
conclusive evidence for or against the unitary model, but the lack of support for the 
predictions of the unitary model could be viewed as weak evidence against the model. 
 
In Tables 3 and 4, we can also see how the respondents answer the same questions on behalf 
of their partner. Generally, the respondents are more willing to let their partner change labor 
supply, in either direction, than they are willing to do themselves, the difference being 
significant at the five percent level in all tables but 3a. One possible interpretation of this is 
that each member of a household, at least to some degree, has a separate budget. In other 
words there is a sharing rule under which each member of the household keeps his/her own 
money (at least to some degree). In both the collective and bargaining models an increase in 
own income affects the bargaining power positively and each member of the household is 
therefore more affected by own choices than by the choices of the other member of the 
household. For the unitary model we would expect a symmetry in the number of persons 
willing to change their own labor supply and the number of persons willing to change the 
labor supply of their partner. The finding that respondents answer ‘yes’ to questions 1 and 2 
more often when their partner is concerned than when they themselves are concerned is at 
first sight compatible with the bargaining and collective models, but not with the unitary 
model. However, there is an alternative explanation. Perhaps the respondent does not wish to 
appear ‘dominant’ towards his or her partner, and therefore answers that he or she would be 
willing to accept changes in the labor supply of the partner, i.e. answer yes more often on 
behalf of the partner than on behalf of himself or herself. On the other hand, most respondents 
answer no on behalf of their partner on question 1, so most people do not seem to be afraid of 
appearing dominant when answering the questions.  
 
So far the evidence has not been conclusive. We have seen that men are more willing to 
increase working hours, which goes against the unitary model, but this may also be explained 
by a lower loss aversion for men. We have also seen that the respondents are more willing to 
let their partner change labor supply, in either direction. Again, this is at odds with the unitary 
model, but it may also be explained by the alternative explanation that respondents do not 
want to appear dominant towards their spouse. However, when combing the responses given 
regarding changes in own and partner’s labor supply we find an interesting pattern to which I 
have found no alternative explanation. Women are more willing to let their partner increase 
working time when answering question 1. When answering question 2 women are less willing 
to let their partner increase their non-market time, conditioned on that women are in general   7
less willing to accept the offer of increased non-market time. A binominal test comparing the 
number of No/Yes and Yes/No responses for men and women for question 1 (18/5 compared 
to 8/7) is significant at the three percent level. A binominal test for question 2 (23/4 compared 
to 23/9) is significant at the five percent level. This definitely goes against the unitary model, 
since if anything we would expect women to put a higher value on their partner’s non-market 
time, since men’s wages are usually higher. The asymmetry of preferences between men and 
women is an indication of a conflict of interests regarding work/non-market time decisions 
within families and is in that very general sense compatible with the bargaining and collective 
models. However, nothing in these models gives the prediction that men and women (or high 
and low wage spouses) should be asymmetrical in the way found in the data.  
 
We may ask why men put a higher value on women’s non-market time than vice versa. One 
interpretation is that the respondents may expect that their own time doing housework would 
decrease if their partner’s non-market time increases. Men may, due to gender roles, expect to 
gain more from this effect and are therefore more willing to increase the non-market time of 
their spouse than vice versa. 
 
Table 5. Summary of results 
Hypothesis from unitary 
model 
Results Alternative  explanation? 
     
Men’s non-market time more 
valuable than women’s.  
Hypothesis rejected  Yes, men less loss averse 
     
Symmetry between valuation 
of own and partner’s non-
market time  
Hypothesis rejected  Yes, respondents may not 
want to appear ‘dominant’ 
towards spouse 
     
Men should put a lower 
value on women’s non-
market time than vice versa 




Many economic decisions are made in a household setting and the interaction between 
household members may have large economic consequences. Unfortunately, we usually only 
observe the outcome of he household decision process. The decision process itself and the 
preferences of the individual members of the household are rarely observed. In this paper, I 
use interview data on preferences for own labor supply and for the labor supply of one’s   8
partner. The main finding is that men put a higher value on women’s non-market time than 
vice versa. This is at odds with what the unitary model predicts. Given that men’s wages are 
usually higher than women’s, the value of non-market time should be higher for men than for 
women. However, the difference between the genders in the valuation of the non-market time 
of one’s partner is not evidence in favor of bargaining or collective models, except in the very 
general sense that there seems to be some divergence of interests between the members of the 
household. 
 
The use of stated preferences on own and partner’s labor supply for studying household 
decision making was proposed already by Kooreman and Kapetyn (1990) and Kapetyn and 
Kooreman (1992). The findings in this paper show that this approach yields interesting results. 
The data used in this paper were not tailor-made to study household decision making, but to 
obtain richer data, for example by interviewing both spouses and collecting more background 
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Table 1. Question 1: Increase of non-market time 
 
Could you imagine your partner 
reducing his/her salary by SEK 
1000 giving him/her two extra 
days off compared to today? 
   Yes  No  Total 
Yes  133 13 146
No  46 79 125
Could you imagine 
reducing your salary by 
SEK 1000 a month if it 
gave you two extra days 





Table 2. Question 2: Increase of income 
 
Could you imagine your 
partner working 10 hours more 
a month so that you would get 
SEK 1000 more a month? 
   Yes  No  Total 
Yes  22 12 34
No  26 225 251
Could you imagine 
working 10 hours 
more a month for an 
extra SEK 1000?  Total  48 237 285
Correlation 0.47 
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 Table 3a. Question 1: Increase of income,  
sub-sample men 
 
Could you imagine your 
partner working 10 hours more 
a month so that you would get 
SEK 1000 more a month? 
   Yes  No  Total 
Yes  13 7 20
No  8 114 122
Could you imagine 
working 10 hours 
more a month for an 
extra SEK 1000?  Total  21 121 142
 
 
Table 3b. Question 1: Increase of income,  
sub-sample women  
 
Could you imagine your 
partner working 10 hours more 
a month so that you would get 
SEK 1000 more a month? 
   Yes  No  Total 
Yes  9 5 14
No  18 111 129
Could you imagine 
working 10 hours 
more a month for an 
extra SEK 1000?  Total  27 116 143
   13
Table 4a. Question 2: Increase of non-market time,  
sub-sample men 
 
Could you imagine your partner 
reducing his/her salary by SEK 
1000 giving him/her two extra 
days off compared to today? 
   Yes  No  Total 
Yes  72 4 76
No  23 33 56
Could you imagine 
reducing your salary by 
SEK 1000 a month if it 
gave you two extra days 





Table 4b. Question 2: Increase of non-market time,  
sub-sample women 
 
Could you imagine your partner 
reducing his/her salary by SEK 
1000 giving him/her two extra 
days off compared to today? 
   Yes  No  Total 
Yes  61 9 70
No  23 46 69
Could you imagine 
reducing your salary by 
SEK 1000 a month if it 
gave you two extra days 
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Appendix 
 
The exact phrasing of question 1 and 2  
Could you imagine working 10 hours more a month for an extra SEK 1000? 
 
Could you imagine reducing your salary by SEK 1000 a month if it gave you two extra days 
off work a month? 
 
If you have a partner, could you imagine him/her working 10 hours more a month so that you 
would get SEK 1000 more a month? (If the interviewee does not have a partner, ask them to 
answer hypothetically, i.e. if they had a partner, could they conceive/imagine) 
 
Similarly, could you imagine your partner reducing his/her salary by SEK 1000 giving 
him/her two extra days off compared to today? 